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CAR WARS: STRIKES, ARBITRATION, AND CLASS
STRUGGLE IN THE MAKING OF LABOR LAW
SIDNEY

L.

HARRING*

The origin of labor law is deeply rooted in the Progressive era, a social
epoch in which individualism, manifested in the law as laissez-faire constitutionalism, gradually gave way to liberal demands that the law be used to ameliorate the high social costs wrought by industrial development. While only
one small part of this larger picture, labor law is of critical importance because
of its key role in regulating the class conflict of the period. Modem labor law
emerged out of the labor unrest of the Progressive era.'
In addition to its historic importance, labor law illustrates some of the
most basic features of American law. It demonstrates the capacity of law to
grow and change in response to new social needs and to restructure the social
life of our society.2 Labor law also shows the legal change effected by militant
political action on the part of the formerly powerless - a basic validation of
the democratic character of American law.
Many legal historians and labor law experts view Progressivism as a middle and upper class reform movement. Hence, they look to these reformers for
the sources of the substantial legal change that swept American labor during
the period.3 This reform movement resulted in child labor legislation, laws
regulating working conditions, wages and hours legislation, the beginnings of
a labor arbitration system, and gave laborers the right to organize. 4 These
reform efforts, however, can also be understood as a strategy on the part of
one sector of monopoly capitalism, (often called "corporate liberals"), to reduce the level of class struggle, stabilize the labor force, and promote broader
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York Law School. B.A., Macalester College, 1968; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School, 1972; Ph.D., University of
Wisconsin, 1976. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Barry Strutt.

1. See S. FINE, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE; A STUDY OF
CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 1865-1901 (1956); M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965 (1970). For general discussion of the evolution of modem labor law, see 3, 4 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932 Q. Commons
ed. 1935); E. WrrrE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932).

2. According to Morton Horwitz and Willard Hurst, two of America's most eminent legal
historians, the capacity of the law to serve as a means to achieve desired social ends is the great
instrumental character of American law. See M. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 1-30 (1977); W. HuRST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
3. See, eg., G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM; A REINTERPRETATION OF

AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963), which is the seminal statement of this thesis.
4. This view has been put forth both implicitly and explicitly in standard labor law texts
and casebooks. See, eg., A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW (1969).
For a brilliant French critique of the foundations of labor law, see Edelman, The Lcgalisation of
the Working Class, 9 ECON. & Soc'Y 50 (1980).
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social harmony that could
permit rapid capital expansion with less violence
5
and less human misery.

Although this view has evidence to support it, it fails to recognize the role
of working class thought and action in structuring early labor law. The work-

ers of the period organized themselves for a wide range of ends, some of them
contradictory. But on a broad front they had clear legal objectives that were
encouraged by democratic values.

Analysis of the legal goals and strategies of the Amalgamated Association
of Street Car Workers lends insight into workers' objectives during the Progressive era. This analysis will focus on the legal and illegal tactics of the
union, including numerous and violent strikes to obtain arbitration contracts.

Such a focus will clarify the union's basic objectives and strategy. Further, it
will reveal the social origins of labor law as having been rooted in the working
class trade unions.

THE STRIKE STRATEGY OF THE AMALGAMATED

Samuel Gompers, of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), organized the Amalgamated in 1893. Gompers recognized the historical working
class militancy among the carmen and sensed the organizational potential of
the street railroad industry.' Typical of other social democratic unions, the

Amalgamated's ideology was not particularly radical. The "bread and butter"
unionism of Samuel Gompers was as much a part of its platform as was the

broader social reform unionism of Eugene Debs.7 At the core of the Amalga5. For an excellent overview of the wide variety of historical positions on the meaning of
the progressive era, see Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism,in THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN
HISTORY: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS (S. Kutler & S. Katz eds. 1982). The two major statements of the "corporate liberal" position are G. KOLKO, supra note 3; J. WEINSTEIN, THE
CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1918 (1968). In spite of the unsatisfactory
nature of the corporate liberal position, analysis of the progressive era has not come far since
the publication of the above works. To the extent that there is one, the opposing view is that
there existed no single "progressive movement," but a set of interrelated "movements" with
different purposes. See, e.g., Filene, An Obituaryfor The ProgressiveMovement', 22 AM. Q. 20
(1970). For a sharply different view than that of Kolko and Weinstein, which sees working
class-based political action at the core of the progressive movement, see 5 P. FONER, HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1980). And for an important analysis
that implicitly supports the positions of Weinstein and Kolko, including data showing a sharp
decline in mass political participation during the period, see W. BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 71-134 (1970).
6. For a general history of the industry, see E. SCHMIDT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
URBAN TRANSPORTATION (1937). The history of the founding of the Amalgamated was published as part of a very detailed history of the union in Motorman and Conductor beginning with
vol. 17 in March, 1909. Motorman and Conductor was the official organ of the Amalgamated
and can therefore be expected to reflect the union's official viewpoints. Motorman and Conductor has been published continuously since 1895. Its name was changed to Motorman, Conductor, and Motor Coach Operator in 1927.
7. This characterization of American labor historiography does not credit the breadth and
complexity of the field. The dichotomy between reform unionism and "bread and butter"
unionism developed early in historical thought about the character of American trade unionism.
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mated's organizing activity was its belief in the fundamental legality of workers' right to organize and hold a property right in their work.
Prevailing conditions in the industry led to many grievances among the
workers. Wages were low and hours long.' Yet the early years of the Amalgamated were full of setbacks. Union rivalries prevented many locals from
joining, the treasury was often empty, and staff worked without pay. Companies strongly resisted unionization and often fired employees thought to be
interested in unions. This pressure forced organizers to work in secret and
kept membership levels low. 9 Many of the early strikes, especially the Milwaukee strike in 1896, failed, discouraging further organizing activity.' 0
Scarcely twenty years later, the Amalgamated had 300 locals and was
administering 200 collective bargaining agreements."1 This rapid growth resulted from the immense organizing energy that the Amalgamated harnessed
during these years. Its strategy called for both the ready (but always reluctant) use of the strike, as well as the arbitration of all disagreements. This
strategy was unique because, of all the AFL unions, only the Amalgamated
had arbitration as a central demand in both its Constitution and organizing
strategy. It is not a paradox, however, that a union engaged in so much strike
activity should have this type of strategy. Both were distinct, but interrelated,
components of an aggressive plan - to win union recognition - that reflected
a deep understanding of the legal and political complexities of union organizing in a period of intense class violence.
The strike was preeminent in this strategy because without the strike or
the serious strike threat, the companies would not even talk to the union. Men
were often dismissed on the merest suspicion of union activity. Even without
that suspicion, employers hired spies to infiltrate their workers to talk to them
about union activity, to take names, and dismiss union sympathizers. One
spy, pretending to work for the Amalgamated, signed up 75 "members" in
Birmingham who were consequently fired."2 After this incident, the Amalgamated repeatedly urged workers not to talk to "union organizers" unless they
had official Amalgamated documents. In this context, the strike became a
basic organizing tool; striking encouraged the employer to regard the union as
a serious bargaining force. However, the survival of the union depended on the
success of strikes by the locals.
The strike, while potentially effective, was also a risky venture, and one
that needed to be tightly disciplined and controlled. To counter manageIt emerged from 1, 2 HISTORY

OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, supra note 1,
and found its way into many labor histories. See, ag., G. GROB, WORKERS AND UTOPIA: A
STUDY OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1865-1900 (1961);

N.

WARE, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES,
8. E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 102-17.

1860-1895 (1964).

9. Mahon, History of OrganizationAmong the Street Railway Employees ofAmerica, MO1897, at 2.
10. E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 138-40.
11. Id at 157. This data was compiled by Schmidt from Motorman and Conductor.

TORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Dec.

12.

MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, July

1913, at 12.
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ment's power and to prevent the possible weakening of the union due to an
excessive number of strikes, national union approval and direction by the
union's national leadership was required for each strike. The collection of a
large strike fund by the national office, which would only be paid out to workers on approved strikes, enforced this practice. The union, therefore, had the
3
luxury of choosing the arenas for its major struggles.'
These strikes were pivotal for the union. An immense investment of
union resources was required to raise strike funds, to assign union officials to
direct the strike, and to mobilize the support of organized labor and of the
community in general. The careful mobilization of massive community support and resistance was critical in every strike and was probably the most
salient feature of the streetcar strikes. Collectively, the more than 200 Amalgamated strikes are still known as the "car wars" because of their high level of
violence. The strikes' death toll, which numbered nearly 100, was greater
than that of any other industry with the exception of coal mining. 4 But while
mining strikes were held in isolated small towns, the car wars occurred in the
main streets of virtually every major city in America, including Chicago (1903
and 1915), St. Louis (1899 and 1903), San Francisco (1902), Philadelphia
(1910), New Orleans (1902 and 1911), Buffalo (1913), Milwaukee (1896),
Cleveland (1899), Indianapolis (1912), and Columbus (1910).'" The Amalgamated's strike strategy took advantage of the social costs of massive urban
violence, and used the public character of these strikes to generate support for
settlement.
The public nature of the strikes determined their characteristics. A street
railway strike, according to one reporter, "[was] always... swift and furious,
carried on amid scenes of violence... [because] [a]ttempts to operate the cars
of a struck service [brought] the hated scabs within close view of strikers and
their sympathizers .
166....
The close proximity of opposing sides, coupled
with the mobile quality of the strikes, prompted cars, mobs, police, and hired
13. E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 174-78, contains a detailed statement of the operation of
this strike policy. Its functioning is detailed in the three major scholarly accounts of the Amalgamated Strikes. See Zeigler, The Limits of Power: The Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees in Houston, Texas, 1897-1905, 8 LABOR HISTORY 71 (1977); Cox, The WilkesBarreStreet Railway Strike of 1915, 94 PA. MAG. OF HIsT. & BIOGRAPHY 75 (1970); Molloy,
Rhode Island Communities and the 1902 Carmen'sStrike, RADICAL HIT. REV., Spring 1978,
at 75. Molloy shows the limitations of the top-down strike control strategy by describing how
the Amalgamated failed to provide, due to a lack of funds, the five dollars a week strike benefit
in the Providence and Pawtucket strikes. He also suggests that the national organization was
overeager to settle - a negative aspect of centralized control that has to be weighed against the
gain of a nationally coordinated strike policy.
14. While the data is incomplete, it is clear that the "car wars" caused more deaths than
any other type of strike except mining. See R. JEFFREYS-JONES, VIOLENCE AND REFORM IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 199-201 (1978).
15. See Chicago Tribune, June 16, 1915, at 7, col. 2; R. JEFFREYS-JONES, supra note 14.
E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 147-49, reports two deaths in Albany/Troy and fourteen in St.
Louis.
16. Rogers, The Streetcar War at Indianapolis, 14 INT'L. SOCIALIST REv. 340, 340-41
(1914).
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guards to embark on wild chases through city streets. It was impossible for
any urban observer to ignore such strikes. In this way the notoriety of the
strikes and pressure to settle them grew.
Given the level of local disruption, it may seem surprising that the street
railway strikes often lasted months. The long length of the strikes, however,
illustrates an aspect of the strikes that added to their intensity: although day
to day activity and disruption was local, the leadership on both sides was national. Beginning in the 1890s, large national syndicates bought up the local
car companies. 17 This broad base allowed the national syndicates to close
down one line while profitting on others. This ability reduced their economic
incentive to settle a particular strike.1 8 Because local disruption was of little
concern to national companies, local businessmen tended to sympathize more
with the strikers.
Similarly, the union was a nationwide organization which maintained a
large strike fund that paid five dollars a week in strike benefits. 19 These payments permitted union locals to strike month after month. The union also
kept a staff of at least a dozen professional strike organizers on the road.2" The
national organization of both sides, combined with the deep class antagonisms
present in turn of the century cities, contributed to the violence of the car
wars.
The strikes' high level of violence occurred because of a single issue
the property right of the streetcar companies to run their cars as they saw fit.
Juridically, under American law, the streetcar companies clearly possessed
that right."z But the Amalgamated believed that workers had an equally important right to their jobs and to bargain over work conditions. Although this
conception of workers' rights was not consistent with dominant laissez-faire
freedom of contract doctrine, that inconsistency was understood by the union
in political terms: the law was too often controlled by corporate wealth.'
On the streets, this conflict resulted in struggle between two large, though
-

17. E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6.
18. The national car syndicates could also afford to keep professional strikebreakers on
retainer and use them on a regular basis in strike after strike. See E. LEVINSON, I BREAK
STRIKES! (1935), an account of strikebreakers in the streetcar industry during this period. The
best current history of the strikebreaking business is R. JEFFREYS-JONES, supra note 15, at 78114.
19. See supra note 13.
20. Motorman and Conductor regularly published reports of the travels of union officers,
the amount of which was staggering. See, eg., MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Sept. 1913.
21. See S. FINE, supra note 1, at 129-68; B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTrrUTION
63-92 (1942).
22. For a summary of the late nineteenth century conservative court, see A. KELLY, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 492-512 (5th ed. 1976). Major works making a more detailed
analysis are A.

PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR
AND BENCH, 1887-1895(1960); NV. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TwEN,ETH CENTURY: THE OLD LEGALrrY, 1889-1932 (1969); Roche, EntrepreneurialLiberty and
the Commerce Power: Expansion, Contraction,and Casuistryin the Age ofEnterprise,30 U. Cm.

L. REV. 680 (1963).
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unequal, forces. On one side stood the police and the private armies of strikebreakers employed by the car companies. On the other side were the motormen and conductors, backed by a substantial network of community
supporters. The companies, to provoke the union and to show that they were
conducting business as usual, generally ran the cars in groups through the
center of town. Frequently aided by paid laborers who removed any track
obstructions, the cars were heavily guarded by local police and private
guards.23 As strikes became more routine, the car companies were among the
first industries to rely heavily on large, well-organized private detective agencies that specialized in all phases of anti-strike work. These men, numbering in
the hundreds in a single strike, were quick to use violence and were protected
against normal legal sanctions both by anonymity and by a company promise
to put up bail and permit them to skip town if arrested.24 The National Guard
was also regularly used to keep the cars running.25
For the workers, these strikes consistently involved more substantial
showings of working-class solidarity than any other type of strike. Crowds of
workers and teamsters helped block the tracks. Women used their wash buckets to soap the tracks, thereby reducing traction. Boys taunted the scabs and
threw rocks at car windows. The more agile climbed poles and cut wires. 26
And after 1908, the dynamiting of streetcars became a feature of some
strikes.2 7
While the union's role in organizing this violence cannot be pinpointed, at
a minimum it seems clear that the union counted on the strikes' violence as a
part of its broader negotiating strategy. Union members themselves were regularly arrested in the strikes, but were only a small proportion of the total
arrested. The statements of union officials, however, give some indication of
the union's encouragement of violence. When the union took a strike vote in
Buffalo in 1913, for example, a member moved to make the strike a peaceful
one. 2 8 William Fitzgerald, a member of the union's executive board sent to
Buffalo to direct the strike, replied that "he had been in strikes for a great
many years and .. had never seen one yet where they handed out lemon
candy and used whiskbrooms ... ."'I He argued that "the men knew what
they had to do to tie up the system and that they should do it."' a During the
23. Accounts of virtually every streetcar strike were most often given detailed coverage in
local newspapers. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, Nov. 13, 1903, at 1, col. 8; Id. June 14, 1915, at 1,
col. 1.
24. For an account of one strike involving heavy use of professional strikebreaker forces,
see The Ohio State Journal, April 5, 1910, at 1, col. 8; Id. May 1, 1910, at 1, col. 8; Id. May 3,
1910, at 1, col. 7; Id. July 11, 1910, at 1, col. I.
25. On the general use of the militia in strikes, see Reinders, Militia and Public Order in
Nineteenth Century America, 11 J. oF AM. STUD. 81 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 20, 1908, at 1, col. 6.
27. Id.
28. Buffalo Express, April 7, 1913, at 1, col. 6.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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June 1905 Pawtucket strike, the Amalgamated's Secretary-treasurer, Rezin
Orr, declared that the mass violence was "only the people uprising in their
a corporation which had apparently up to the present owned
wrath against
31
them."
This careful and indirect advocation of violence made a great deal of
sense in the political context of the day. Labor was not at all powerful and
labor organizers worked in a hostile legal climate. Both the state and the car
companies commanded large armed forces that were readily mobilized against
the union. Yet the Amalgamated, as its actions indicated, recognized that
only rigorous and virulent strike activity would get the union both the power
and credibility it needed to force the car companies to even begin considering
the question of union recognition. All the other goals of the motormen and
conductors depended upon that recognition because only then could workers,
together, negotiate for improved working conditions and wages.
II
ARBITRATION AND CLASS STRUGGLE

The ready and open willingness to strike was one pillar of the Amalgamated's political and economic strategy; the demand for "arbitration" was the
second. The demand for arbitration was in the union's constitution and was
repeatedly raised by the union before, during, and after its strikes.32 Elaborate
procedures in the union's constitution required that all means to resolve a
dispute short of striking be attempted and that the union make an offer to
arbitrate the dispute.33 The constitution specifically forbade striking unless
these procedures were followed.3 4 Consequently, Amalgamated strikes were
highly disciplined and methodical. Not only were there few wildcats strikes,
but officials of the national union were generally able to arrive on the scene to
participate in the last stages of negotiation and strike preparation.35 This prestrike organization resulted in better strike preparation. Furthermore, the
union's brand of arbitration was aggressive and focused on the same goals
sought by a strike.36 Linking arbitration with vigorous strike activity was deliberate and effective: both were co-equal elements of a comprehensive
strategy.
The concept of arbitration emerged out of the Progressive era as a reform
tactic designed to reduce industrial unrest and to resolve strikes nonvi31. Molloy, supra note 13, at 90. In his 1896 Labor Day speech Amalgamated President
William Mahon, at a time when many unions routinely denied the charge that strikes were
inherently lawless, agreed with the proposition. He went on to ask his audience to look at the
lawlessness of businessmen and to stop judging labor by a double standard. MOTORMAN AND
CONDUCTOR, Nov. 1896, at 4.
32. E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 199-207.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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olently.3 7 The first national arbitration law was the Erdman Act of 1898 (the
Act),3 8 which provided for voluntary arbitration of railroad labor disputes.3 9
Until 1907, however, only one attempt was made to utilize the Act's voluntary
arbitration provisions.4 ° The Act had its roots in a number of state arbitration

schemes - often "voluntary arbitration" schemes such as those used orginally
in Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts in the late 1870s and 1880s

-

which were based on the work of middle and upper class social reformers like
Joseph Weeks and Carroll Wright.4 ' Weeks, in turn, had borrowed heavily
from British and French arbitration models that dated back to the early 19th
century. 42 At the request of Governor Hanraft of Pennsylvania, who was concerned about industrial disorder in the iron and coal industries, Weeks trav-

eled to Europe in 1878 and the results of his study were subsequently
reported.4 3 Soon thereafter, beginning in the early 1880s, a number of states

established boards of arbitration and conciliation.'

These entities were

designed to promote voluntary arbitration of industrial disputes by making the
services of experts available to both sides."a These services, however, were not
widely used until well into the twentieth century.4 6
The Erdman Act's initial failure stemmed, in large part, from employers'

resistance to it. Employers had two related reasons for opposing any kind of
arbitration law. First, the idea of arbitration was philosophically inconsistent
37. Jensen, Notes on the Beginningsof Collective Bargaining,9 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.,
225 (1956) correctly locates the origins of labor's impulse to arbitrate, although I do not agree
that the early unions conceptualized it as a "moderate, conservative process," as Jensen concludes. The most complete history of early arbitration in America is C. MOTE, INDUSTRIAL
ARBITRATION (1916).
38. Erdman Act, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898).
39. On the origins of federal "arbitration" in relation to railroad labor, see E. WITTE, THE
GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932); Eggert, A Missed Alternative: Federal Courts as
Arbiters of Railway Labor Disputes, 1877-1895, 6 LAB. HIST. 287 (1966); J. LEIBY, CARROLL
WRIGHT AND LABOR REFORM (1960). It is important to note that there were widespread

inconsistencies in the use of the term "arbitration" in the Progressive era. Initially, it was often
used to refer to any "conciliation" scheme wherein the parties met and tried to resolve the
dispute informally. It also referred to "mediation" formats where the parties tried to resolve
differences with the assistance of a third party. In periods of intense class conflict, however,
both of these approaches gave way to "umpire" formats, where a panel or person was empowered, by agreement of both parties, to decide the issues in dispute. This arbitration format is at
the core of today's system of collective bargaining.
40. See

MOTORMAN

& CONDUCTOR, May 1912, at 6.

41. A brief legislative history of early arbitration statutes can be found in C. MoTE, stpra
note 37, at 196-204.
42. Carroll Wright published an early report, C. WRIGHT, INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION
AND ARBITRATION (1881), at the request of the Massachusetts State Legislature that was heavily based on Weeks' research. Wright's clearly reformist orientation, and his ignorance of major
working class issues, is described in J. LEIBY, supra note 39, at 39-94.
43. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 42.
44. See supra note 41.
45. Id. at 199-203.

46. On the increasing use of industrial arbitration, see Id. at 242-47. On the various explanations for the failure of the state arbitration schemes in use at the beginning of the twentieth
century, see Id. at 248-67.
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with laissez-faire conceptions of freedom of contract from which employers
implied an absolute right to conduct business activities as they saw fit. Secondly, arbitration was a product of the growing working class trade union
movement and the social and political ideas the movement promoted did not
appeal to capitalist employers.
Prior to 1900, the term arbitration meant any form of negotiated settlement achieved short of a strike.4 7 Emphasis was on the process of face-to-face
negotiation usually within a formal structure.4 Almost any structure was
considered adequate since the notion that labor and capital be treated as
equals was itself a great victory. The Knights of Labor acquired the idea of
arbitration from William Sylvan's National Labor Union and the Knights of
St. Crispin, the shoemakers' union that is generally regarded as the first national union.4 9 Both of these unions bridged the transition between the era of
small craft industries and monopoly capitalism. During this period, arbitration became a fundamental right of workers that was solidly grounded upon
natural law and equity as well as the equality of labor and capital.5 0
In the 1870s, the rise of monopoly capitalism and laissez-faire notions of
private property reduced the status of American workers to that of hired
hands without rights." In addition, a series of bitter strikes occurred during
the 1870s and 1880s that ended in defeat for the workers. Furthermore, the
strike concept was perceived by many to be criminal and un-American." Following these setbacks, the Knights of Labor began to put forth the idea of
arbitration, but they did so from a weak and defensive position. The employers simply did not pay attention; employers had no ideological reason to support arbitration and organized labor lacked the power to compel even
negotiation.
The Knights of Labor advocated the kind of arbitration that involved
negotiation and conciliation but which was premised on preindustrial notions
of equality of labor and capital. These preindustrial notions encompassed the
idea that people of good faith should simply sit down and talk through their
grievances. If the grievances could not be resolved informally, then they
should be resolved formally using arbitration boards made up of representatives of both sides. In this context, even the distinction between compulsory
and voluntary arbitration broke down. Since both sides were honor-bound to
respect their agreements and as long as that faith was kept, there was no need
47. The term "'arbitration" did not have a precise meaning in the nineteenth century. This
is a recurring theme in N. WARE, supra note 7, at 123-24, 127, 200-01, 211. 262. See also
Jensen, supra note 37.
48. C. MOTE, supra note 37, at 191-214.
49. N. WARE, supra note 7, at 200-04.
50. N. WARE, supra note 7.
51. For the best description of this process, see D. Mox I'GOMI.RY. BUXON EQU %iIfl-%:
LABOR AND TM_ RADICAl. Ri.PUBI.ICANS

(1967).

52. See Morse, The Molly VcGuire Trials, I1 AM. L. Ri-v. 233 (IS77): Selfridge, A4,,nrican
Law of Strikes and Boycotts as Crimes, 22 ANi. L. Ri'v. 233 (1888).
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for any coercive legal mechanisms.53
It is important to note that of all the early AFL unions only the Amalgamated directly included a strong "arbitration" requirement in its constitution
and adhered to it rigidly. The Amalgamated was "required to encourage the
'5 4
settlement of all disputes between employees and employers by arbitration. "
All local divisions were required to offer to engage in arbitration before going
on strike.
The Amalgamated's arbitration requirement originated from several
sources. First, it can be traced directly to the Knights of Labor. The Amalgamated took over whole Knights lodges as it aggressively organized the industry in the wake of the Knights' decline. The Knights had met with notable
success in the streetcar industry and that success fed the fledgling Amalgamated. Second, the arbitration strategy had secured a contract in the Amalgamated's home local, run from union headquarters in Detroit, as early as 1891.
This union accomplishment was due to reformist Mayor Hazen Pingree's ability to get the car company to negotiate, something that few mayors were willing to attempt. This early success also thrust the Detroit local into the
leadership of the national union. 5
While these factors figured prominently in putting arbitration into the
language of the Amalgamated constitution, they do not explain why the
Amalgamated alone put such an emphasis on arbitration when other AFL
unions had similar exposure to the concept of arbitration. Arbitration was
central to the Amalgamated's strategy because when combined with the strike
policy, arbitration worked. It worked uniquely well in the strongly anti-union
legal climate of the 1890s since it legitimated the union in spite of the union's
militant strike policy. As long as arbitration was central to the union's policy,
it transformed much of the strike issue into a moral one favoring the union.
The political and legal strength of the car companies thus became liabilities:
the car companies could never adequately explain why they could not arbitrate honest differences with their employees.
The Amalgamated also knew that strikes were necessary to achieve union
demands. Without at least the threat of a strike, no company would agree to
arbitrate. At the same time, despite prior criticism that strikes were antisocial
or even criminal,56 the union's offer to arbitrate made its use of the strike
legitimate. Strikes, as defined in the Amalgamated's constitution, were measures of last resort, engaged in only against companies that would not arbitrate.
53. C.

MOTE,

supra note 37, at 195.

54. On the process of arbitration through Amalgamated contracts, see E. SCHMIDT, supra
note 6, at 199-207.
55. E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 193-94. Schmidt suggested that Hazen Pingree was
responsible for the Amalgamated's arbitration policy. The most notable study of Pingree's Detroit administration does not confirm this conclusion, however, but states instead that Pingree
pressed for arbitration. This position did not differ sharply from that of other mayors stuck
between a powerful union and a politically well-connected streetcar company. M. HOLLI, RI*FORM IN DETROIT: HAZEN S. PINGREE AND URBAN POLITICS 4 (1969).
56. Supra note 52.
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Even if a strike failed, arbitration served as a permanent fallback position and
thereby demonstrated the Amalgamated's good faith." Although the properly prepared strike remained a formidable tool, once a strike was initiated,
the arbitration demand mollified antiunion sentiment and helped the union
organize the necessary community support. And if the union chose to strike,
the arbitration demand also gave it a moderate way out. The union did not
need to win strikes since forcing the companies into arbitration was a significant victory. Thus, arbitration prevented the continual wearing down of
union resources and helped sustain a vigorous strike policy. The strike became a well-planned implement in the arbitration process.
When strikes were won, the company and the union entered into labor
contracts. Normally, the first feature of such contracts consisted of the company recognizing the union and guaranteeing the right of workers to belong to
the union. Then, after wages, hours, and working conditions were included in
the contract, the union insisted upon a clause binding both parties to agree to
arbitration of all disputes arising under the contract. The method of arbitration was also always spelled out and almost always the same; each party was
to choose one arbitrator and the two together were to select a third."8 This
moved the Amalgamated from one phase of arbitration, which focused on
compromise between two intransigent positions, to a result-oriented arbitration underpinned by contract unionism. In essence, the Amalgamated and the
companies were involved in a meaningful dialogue based upon joint administration of union contracts in the resolution of labor disputes.
In 1901, the union administered twenty-two collective bargaining agreements. This number rose to over 100 in 1907 and to over 200 in 1915, and
virtually all of the agreements contained arbitration clauses. 59 Once this process was in place, there was, at least in theory, a mechanism to settle complex
disputes over wages, hours, and working conditions without strikes. In practice, however, strike activity continued because either companies dishonored
the contracts or the parties could not agree on a new contract after an old one
57. This arbitration policy is briefly summarized in SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 193-207.
This policy is also referred to in virtually every issue of Motorman and Conductor.
58. Following is the arbitration clause from one of the first Amalgamated arbitration
agreements, the 1896 Detroit agreement. The full text of the agreement was published in MoTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, July 1896, at 186, as an example for other locals to follow. Such
agreements were often printed in the union's newspaper and were an important part of the legal
culture of the Amalgamated:
Sect. 6. Should any difference arise between the parties hereto that cannot be adjusted
by the voluntary agreement of the parties hereto the matters in dispute shall be submitted, at the request of either party, to a board of arbitrators, of three persons, and
the findings of a majority of such board shall be binding upon the respective parties
hereto. The parties hereto shall each choose one member and the two thus selected
shall choose a third. The three thus chosen shall constitute such board of arbitrators.
Vacancies that may occur shall be filled in the same manner. When a case is submitted to arbitration each party shall name arbitrators within three (3) days. In case of
the failure of either party to so name its arbitrators, it shall forfeit its case.
59. E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 157. These dates were compiled by Schmidt from Motorman and Conductor.
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expired. In the former situation, the persistent volatility of the car industry
prompted large syndicates which ran non-union companies to purchase small
car companies with union contracts and then refuse to honor the previously
negotiated contract. Although these agreements were not always dishonored,
when they were the union in effect had to reestablish itself by, among other
methods, resorting to strike activity.
The union absolutely insisted that "arbitration" meant contractual arbitration imposed by joint agreement of the parties, rather than the kind of compulsory arbitration imposed by the government.' This position was a strong
one, very much influenced by deep suspicion of the national government as
unalterably antilabor, an experience rooted in the federal government's intervention in the Pullman strike of 1894.61 However, this resistance to compulsory arbitration did not, in the end, extend to attempts by local courts to order
specific performance of the contract to arbitrate. Indeed this tactic was emblematic of a strategy to force the companies to the bargaining table. It also,
for the first time, put the Amalgamated in an alliance with city governments
who were tired of the "car wars" and tired of wearing out their police departments on strikes that seemed endless.62
The Amalgamated's willingness to arbitrate may seem surprising but can
be understood in the context of their repeated statement that the union could
not "lose" an arbitration. Motorman and Conductor, the union journal, repeatedly published arbitration awards that always included pay gains and
often included work concessions as well. 63 Sensitive to charges that the arbitration strategy cost members gains that might have been won through strikes,
the union compared the gains it won from strikes, mediation, and bargaining.
It conceded that it often won the highest increases from bargaining but recognized that arbitration awards were often compromises reached only after bargaining failed and could therefore be expected to be lower. It also conceded
that it could not readily measure the gains won in strikes. For one thing,
many strikes ended in arbitration so one could not pinpoint the source of the
victory. Secondly, many strikes were lost, considerably reducing the average
gain. How many strikes were won or lost is not easily determinable, since
both sides often claimed victories. It does seem, however, that the union lost
60. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Apr. 1895.

61. The origin of compulsory arbitration occurred in the area of the railroads, in the context of the national emergency of World War I. See generally Eggert, supra note 39. On the
judiciary's response to the first compulsory arbitration laws, see Simpson, ConstitutionalLimi.
tations on Compulsory Industrial Arbitration Laws," 38 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1925). In the
general context of the Pullman strike, see N. SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND
SOCIALIST(1982); MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, April 1895.
62. The (Des Moines) Register and Leader, Oct. 2, 1912, at 1, col. 7; id. Oct. 4, 1912, at 1,
col. 7; id. Oct. 5, 1912, at 1, col. 1; id. Oct. 7, 1912, at 1, col. 1; MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR,
April 1912, at 36; id. Nov. 1911, at 30-31; E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 194.
63. These awards were printed in virtually every issue of Motorman and Conductor. The
1912 Des Moines agreement, for example, was printed in MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Apr.,
1912, at 36.
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nearly eighty percent of its strikes between 1894 and 1900 and approximately
twenty percent between 1900 and 1910.64
The idea that arbitration always produced a union victory must be seen as
a manifestation of the process itself. The arbitration award was necessarily a
compromise, but it was one that had to be reached in the quiet of an office by
three people, one of whom represented the union and another who was amenable to the union representative. The goal of all three people was to at least
minimize the potential for strike damages, and the company had already
agreed to be bound by the result. Specifically, the company had already chosen not to fight the strike at all costs.
Besides the inherently compromising nature of the process, another part
of the union victory stemmed from the employers' wealth, intransigence, and
poor labor history. The union knew the nature of its opposition quite well.
Working conditions were easily documented as not only inhumane, but dangerous to the public. Within the infrastructure of the companies, profit levels
easily financed raises without seriously undermining net profits. Finally, the
union knew that strikes were expensive to the company. An official of the
Philadelphia line admitted, after a violent 1910 strike, that no company could
any longer "win" a strike. That official, Daniel T. Pierce, said: "One of the
lessons drawn from the Philadelphia labor battle is that no street railway company can.., win a strike of its motormen and conductors ....
(A] street
railway can only win a strike at a cost greater than the value of the victory to
be obtained., 6 A good deal of the impetus for the progressive movement can
be found in such logic.
The union's fight to organize was an extended one. The move toward
arbitration did not reduce the number of strikes or make the union less aggressive. The more contracts the union won, the harder it pushed to organize
more companies. The success of organizing drives, especially in the years after
1907, were marked by an increased number of strikes - reaching fifteen
strikes per year by 1911.66 The year 1910 saw the union involved in fifteen
strikes and lockouts and twenty-three arbitrations.67 This level of activity is
an immense increase for a union with perhaps 150 contracts in force.
Arbitration was often not an alternative to a strike, but the end product
of one; both sides agreed to arbitrate their differences in order to end a conflict
that was too costly to carry on. The Amalgamated, however, knew that it
always won two things with an agreement. First, it won defacto union recognition because the company signed an agreement with the union to "arbitrate"
differences between management and labor. Second, it knew that it would win
wages and conditions-of-living concessions in the arbitration because those
64.
65.

Jan. 1911.
Feb. 1911, at 12.
66. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Jan. 1911, at 19.
67. Id.
MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR,

MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR,
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conditions were objectively inferior and because labor had substantial power
on the arbitration panel.
Arbitration agreements, even if not followed by the employers, did not
seriously set the union back. The union could always strike again. The pattern of repeated strikes in city after city resulted from employers repeatedly
reneging on such agreements. Employers reneged for a number of reasons.
Often, employers believed that arbitration awards would not be so extensive as
they turned out to be and therefore were unwilling to meet the agreement's
conditions. Other times, employers never really agreed to the conditions but
just wanted to buy time or harass the union.6"
The union's demand for arbitration, then, was simply one tactical weapon
available in their struggle against the car companies. Arbitration, however,
was not perceived by the union as a progressive reform. The union's use of
arbitration had its roots in natural law notions of fairness and equity, adopted
in modified form from the Knights of Labor and earlier American workers'
movements.
III
THE COURTS ENFORCE ARBITRATION

The Amalgamated's arbitration policy rested on the establishment of private contracts, each containing an arbitration agreement, between the locals
and the streetcar companies. The union preferred private contracts because it
feared that government intervention would inevitably favor the employers. As
a result, though it often utilized state arbitration boards, the Amalgamated
initially did not seek to enforce contracts in the courts.6 9 In time, however, the
union began to turn more to the courts to enforce its contracts.
In the early years of the twentieth century, the Amalgamated was extensively involved in strike activity. The union orchestrated as many as ten to
twenty strikes per year.70 At the same time, the union won many contracts,
almost all of which called for the arbitration of disputes. Obtaining contracts,
however, did not end the union's struggle. Many employers entered into contracts only to terminate a strike and build strength in order to break the union
in the future. Consequently, the union had to enforce its contracts by continually threatening to strike. Two exceptionally bloody strikes occurred in Columbus, Ohio, in 1910, despite the presence of an arbitration contract. The
Columbus strikes illustrated the fundamental weakness of the union's arbitra68. See, e.g., Heston, The Street Car Strike at Columbus, I1 INT'L SOCIALIST REV. 133
(1910), on the Columbus strike of 1910 which occurred in spite of an existing arbitration
agreement.
69. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, April 1895, at 19.
70. E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 174-78, discusses the high level of strike activity carried
out by the Amalgamated. While there is no general census of their strikes, Motorman and
Conductor appears to have reported virtually all of them. This is my own estimate based on all
of the accounts in Motorman and Conductor.
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tion policy and taught the Amalgamated the importance of using legal means
to enforce its arbitration contracts rather than relying solely on the strike.
By the 1920s, the union started to find an ally in the courts. The laissezfaire freedom of contract doctrine that had been used heavily by employers to
defeat both unions and social welfare legislation 7 I increasingly came to be used
to enforce the Amalgamated's contracts. Under that doctrine, because the
companies had freely chosen to enter into labor contracts with the Amalgamated, the courts could order the companies to honor their contracts.
The freedom of contract doctrine was first used to enforce an Amalgamated contract during the August, 1911 Des Moines strike.7" The conflict
began when a union conductor was fired without the discharge hearing provided for by the union contract.73 The Amalgamated reacted in its customary
way, sending an Executive Board member to Des Moines to secure enforcement of the contract, but prepared to strike if necessary. The company's intransigence pushed the union into a strike and although no strike violence
occurred, the city's corporation counsel immediately applied for an injunction
against the strike. After arguing that the public required regular streetcar
services, the city's petition pointed out that there was an arbitration agreement
in effect between the two parties and that the company had "refused to submit
the controversy to a board of arbitration as provided in said working agreement."'74 A city court immediately ordered that the striking conductor be reinstated, the carmen return to work, and the company run its cars in regular
service." The union quickly seized on that injunction as a major union victory - a vindication of the Amalgamated's twenty year arbitration policy.7 6
The Amalgamateds failure to even attempt to enforce its contracts in
courts for nearly fifteen years evidences the level of the union's alienation, like
other unions of the time, from a legal system that they could not trust. But
once a court actually enforced an Amalgamated contract, the union quickly
recognized that the Des Moines injunction was more than a symbolic victory.
Most of the union's strike activity thenceforth was used to enforce existing
contracts instead of increasing the number of unionized systems. If the courts
would take up part of the burden of enforcing contracts, the union would be
free of that obligation.
It was not only the Amalgamated that was interested in the "Des Moines
plan," as it came to be called. The plan was widely circulated in Midwestern
newspapers and was thereafter seized upon by local governments as a tool to
end local "car wars." There was thus a double irony to the Amalgamated's
use of injunctions after Des Moines: not only did the union begin to seek the
very judicial decrees which had for so long been used to stymie its interests
71. See infra notes 81-116 and accompanying text.

72.

MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR,

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

Aug. 1911, at 6-8.
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and actions, but the courts issued these decrees based on the same laissez-faire
doctrine underpinning its pre-Des Moines orders. Far from becoming more
enlightened, the courts were simply recognizing the power of the union embodied in its contracts with companies." This irony may well explain why the
Amalgamated and its lawyers did not originate the Des Moines plan or argue
for it prior to its adoption in 1911 78
IV
CLASS LEGISLATION: THE AMALGAMATED'S
LEGISLATIVE GOALS

It was not unreasonable for the Amalgamated to have expended some of
its efforts and resources in order to achieve change through the legislature.
Yet the Amalgamated did not trust the lawmaking process because it felt that
the law was in the hands of labor's enemies. This perception resulted from the
courts' reluctance to broadly interpret the police power of state legislatures. 9
Thus, legislation that served workers' interests - wage and hour legislation,
industrial safety legislation, and municipal ownership legislation - was generally held unconstitutional.8 0
The Amalgamated, however, had a very active legislative program, and
was not deterred by either its failure to get important measures through the
legislatures or the practice of courts to hold new laws unconstitutional. The
Amalgamated's legislative program was motivated by dual considerations: the
desire to move ideas into the forefront of political discussion and the desire to
expose the greed of the railroad companies who placed a higher value on ac77. The misuse of the injunction was a major grievance of the early labor movement
against the legal system. The movement recognized the commonality of class interests between
the employers and the local judiciary. For a detailed discussion of the context of the labor
injunction, see E. WrrrE, supra note 39, at 83-133; Ralston, Use and Abuse of Injunctions in
Trade Disputes, 36 ANNALS 89 (1910). Injunctions were not often used in street railroad strikes
because, given existing interpretations of public order laws, they were unnecessary. The employers did not need an injunction to obtain the assistance of the city police and other law
enforcement forces since ordinary interpretations of existing criminal laws easily permitted such
intervention. Hence, police arrests and court prosecution took the place of the injunction in
street railroad strikes, even though the employers occasionally sought injunctions for both symbolic purposes and also to bolster the legitimacy of their positions.
78. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Aug. 1911, at 6-8. It is important to place the Des
Moines plan in context. It was unique in that a court had ordered compliance with a union
contract. The Amalgamated had been concerned with various legal options to enforce its contracts because any legal option was preferable to relying on the strike for enforcement. Before
the Des Moines strike, the best way to protect the contract was through state legislation. This
issue was precisely at the heart of the Columbus strike where the union was powerless to enforce
its contract. Motorman and Conductor had urged "formulating a law that [would] be more
effective in protecting the interests of the public against public utility strikes," and argued that
the people "have the right, through legislation, to control public utility corporations." MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Nov. 1910, at 11. This statement indicates that the Amalgamated had
substantially more confidence in the legislative process than in the judicial process, perhaps
because they had met with some success prior to 1910.
79. See B. Twiss, supra note 21, at 110-40.
80. Id.
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cumulating profits than on human safety. The union's major legislative objectives were: (1) municipal ownership; (2) vestibule laws; (3) air brake laws; and
(4) hours of work legislation.
The demand for municipal ownership was the most political of the
union's legislative goals. It originated in the common struggle of rail unions
against a railroad industry dominated by monopoly capitalists who made
money on real estate and on cartels that profited from the transportation of
basic commodities. Drawing heavily on the European experience of public
ownership and on public resentment of the railroad industry that stemmed
from the early populist movements of the 1870s, the demand for public ownership served a tactical function as well as a political one. As a proposed solution to the problem of street railroad strikes, it was a useful negotiating tool.
It also eloquently bespoke the ultimate political goals of the union.
The Amalgamated's campaign for municipal ownership took a number of
forms. On the highest level, it was part of the union's social democratic political agenda. Steps toward municipal ownership were published, along with
news of municipal ownership in Europe.8 1 Municipal ownership had a practical political quality to it because, unlike most legislation, which had to be
passed by state legislatures, municipal ownership legislation could be enacted
by city councils and was therefore a more attainable union goal at the turn of
the century. Still, the union achieved little success with actual municipal ownership in the period before World War I. The Detroit local, among the strongest, succeeded in attaining municipal ownership. Cleveland achieved
municipal ownership in 1908, but the action led to a violent strike as the new
municipally owned company renounced its Amalgamated contract and refused to negotiate with the union. 2
The Amalgamated knew that it generally fared better in legislatures than
it did in courts. In a world where legal doctrine induced bitter debate over
whether the state's police power permitted a law providing for a simple stool
upon which a motorman could sit, the issue of municipal ownership was almost scandalous since it was based on the complete antithesis of the period's
dominant laissez-faire constitutional ideology.8 3 William Mahon, the president of the union and editor of Motorman and Conductor,laid out this sharply
different analysis of the Constitution as follows:
[T]hose who desire to rob their fellow men and prevent the advancement of civilization... tried to make our revolutionary fathers be81. Regular essays on socialism appeared in Motorman and Conductor. Eugene Debs was
among the socialist writers who contributed essays to the magazine. Union president Mahon
was also a contributor. Socialist literature and literature preaching Christian Socialism was also
published. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, June 1907.
82. Similarly, the union's Canadian experience, where municipal ownership was much
more widely achieved, was also negative. City-owned companies in Port Arthur and Calgary
refused to negotiate union contracts. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Sept. 1913, at 32; MoTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, July

1904, at 8.

83. See, e.g., Brown, The DetroitStreet Railway Decision, 33 AM. L Rev. 853 (1899).
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lieve in the divine right of kings, and that it would be
unconstitutional for them to establish a republic on this side of the
Atlantic, and when we wanted to emancipate the slave, and extend
the right of franchise to all mankind, they again raised the same old
cry "unconstitutional." Now when the conditions have arisen that
make it necessary to take another step along the road of civilization
by the municipality assuming control of its street railways to protect
the public and employees from robbery and plunder and extend the
lines of civilization, the same old cry of "unconstitutional" is
raised.8 4
On another occasion, Mahon again poked fun at the predominant legal
theory of the day. Milwaukee's socialist city council had passed a city ordinance providing for free water for washerwomen, after they had been advised
by the city attorney that the law was unconstitutional. 5 Mahon pointed to an
obvious double standard: if the city council had given land to a street railroad,
free water and taxes to a corporation, or a free franchise to a streetcar company, such actions would clearly be constitutional - indeed, they were standard practice. It was necessary, said Mahon, for legislative bodies to "break
away from... old and foolish notions of constitutional rights when it comes
to making laws that will actually relieve
destitution and give proper assistance
86
from the government to the people."
The Amalgamated worked hard to obtain meaningful safety legislation,
which was the most conservative and attainable of its goals. Of all the safety
measures the union advocated, the most financially insignificant in its eyes, yet
the most resisted by the companies, was the provision for a safe and comfortable place for the motorman to work - the exposed vestibule in the front of the
car. The union achieved its first "vestibule law" in Ohio in 1893, the year of
its founding.8 7
The success in Ohio belied the complexity of the controversy that followed. The employers fought bitterly because the mere existence of such laws
violated their legal right to control private property. 8 Ultimately, the issue
did not concern vestibules. The companies, for example, resisted a Kentucky
84.

MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR,

Sept. 1898, at 6.

85. Mahon, filwaukee's UnconstitutionalOrdinance, MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Jan.
1911, at 37.
86. Id.
87. 1893 Ohio Laws 220. The Ohio Vestibule Law required street car companies to install
screens to protect motormen from foul weather. It is reprinted in Mahon, History of Organization Among the Street Railway Employees of America, MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Nov.
1904, at 11. A car company from Springfield refused to implement the law, seeking to test it iII
the state courts. The constitutionality of the law was upheld the next year in State v. Nelson, 52
Ohio St. 88, 39 N.E. 22 (1894).
88. Since the cost of a vestibule was estimated at fifteen dollars in testimony before the
Connecticut legislature in 1897 (where the bill failed), the real issue was the control of capital.
MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR,

Mar. 1897, at 6.
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law that provided only for a stool for the motorman. 9 Even in Ohio, when
the union sought to extend the protection of the vestibule law to conductors
the bill was vetoed by Governor Harmon because "the measure [was] class
legislation." 9° The union tried again in 1911 only to meet the same fate.9 1
The Amalgamated put its full political clout behind vestibule legislation
primarily because it was the most visible safety issue facing the company,
although arguably the air brake issue was more important.92 The energy put
behind the vestibule bill reflected the merger of Amalgamated's concern for
the simple health of its workers and the staggering human cost of the street
railroad industry. In 1909, thirty-six Amalgamated members were killed on
the job.93 The cars were therefore responsible for seventeen percent of all the
deaths of union members, more than any other cause except tuberculosis. 94
That the car companies would not spend a mere fifteen dollars per car on
safety (the cost of one vestibule) was a powerful argument against the "laissezfaire" position of the car companies. The union's success with the "vestibule"
issue, however, was a mixed one. Minnesota, Maryland, Wisconsin, and Indiana followed Ohio's example during the middle 1890s. 91 But in other states
the measure failed. In Illinois, for instance, the vestibule bill passed the lower
house 108 to 4 and died in a Senate Committee.9 6 And in Texas, the legislature passed the bill only to have it declared unconstitutional by the Texas
Supreme Court.9 7
One of the ironies of the Amalgamated's hostility to the courts is that
even in an era where labor legislation usually failed to pass constitutional mus89. Typical language can be seen in the Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision in Silva v.
City of Newport, 150 Ky. 781, 785, 150 S.W. 1024, 1025-26 (1912). Although the issue here
concerned only the provision for a stool, the case was similar to a vestibule case. Justice Settle
wrote:
[I]t is within the police power of the State to protect any class of its citizens, which
stands in need of such protection. And it is not wide of the mark to say that the
motormen who operate street cars are in need of such protection... the effect of
enforcing the ordinance will [also] be to protect the traveling public.
Id. at 785, 150 S.W. at 1025-26.
90. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, OCL 1911, at 39.
91. Id.

92. Motorman and Conductor argued that, "[a]ccidents would often be averted for the
motorman would not be blinded by the storm and the car would not be allowed to rush into
unseen danger." MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Mar. 1897, at 6. Besides the narrow issue of
visibility a larger safety argument was related to fatigue and conditions of work; long hours of
standing at careful attention produced a fatigue that increased the possibility of accidents.
93. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Oct. 1911.

94. Id.
95. E. SCHMIDT,

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN URBAN TRANSPORTATION 128, 132, 134

(1937).
96. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, June 1911, at 39.
97. Beaumont Traction Co. v. State, 46 Tex Civ. App. 576 (1907); see also MOTORMAN
AND CONDUCTOR, Oct. 1911, at 39. New York State's first vestibule law, a Yonkers city ordinance, was declared an unreasonable use of the police power - and thus a violation of the state
constitution. The court held that a preponderence of the evidence showed that the vestibule
was "more of a menace than a protection to health and safety." City of Yonkers v. Yonkers
R.R. Co., 51 A.D. 271, 273 (1900).
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ter as unlawful exercises of the "police power," the vestibule law fared better
in the courts than in the legislatures. Perhaps the ultimate proof of the insignificance of the vestibule laws and the viciousness of corporate resistance to
them, in view of the obvious public good at small cost, is that some courts had
no problem upholding them.98
The struggle to obtain air brake legislation was much harder. In comparison to the fight for vestibule legislation, company resistance to air brake legislation was even stiffer because, despite the prospect of greater savings of
human life, more money was at stake. Efficient braking action was obviously
important given the crowded conditions under which the cars operated. Yet
companies often relied on hand brakes. Given the weight and speed of the
cars, the idea that hand brakes were adequate to stop the cars was ridiculous.
The air brake, however, involved relatively simple technology, stopped the
cars more quickly, and required less exertion on the part of the motorman.
Michigan adopted an air brake law in 1903 forcing the Detroit system to equip
its cars in 1904,99 an action that was heralded by the Amalgamated. 100
Detroit's city ordinance requiring car companies to install air or electric
brakes was challenged by the railway company in People v. Detroit United
Railway.10' In an extensive evidentiary hearing, the company offered a host of
arguments to show the unreasonable nature of the city's exercise of the police
power. They argued that: the air brake was experimental and it was not clear
that it actually performed better than the hand brake; the presence of two
braking systems (air brake and back-up hand brake system) would confuse the
motormen; and the $350,000 installation cost for the company's several hundred cars was prohibitive. The court's opinion revealed how far the police
power doctrine had come in the ten years since State v. Nelson.10 2 "It is past
controversy," stated the court, "that the city may regulate the conduct of defendant's business to the extent of requiring reasonable safeguards against
danger."10' 3 As legal ground for this statement, the court relied on the full
range of streetcar safety cases that had resulted from the Amalgamated's policy initiatives." A group of Brooklyn railroad companies subsequently challenged a similar statute, mainly on the grounds that the cost was excessive and
deprived them of their property without due process of law. The companies
98. See, e.g., Silva v. City of Newport, 150 Ky. 781, 785, 150 S.W. 1024, 1025-26 (1912).
99. The law provided as follows: "[o]n and after May 1, 1902, no street car or cars shall be
operated or run on any street, avenue, or highway in the city of Detroit, unless the same be
equipped with air or electric brakes." See People v. Detroit United Railway, 134 Mich. 682,
684-85, 97 N.W. 36, 38-39 (1903).
100. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Sept. 1904.

101. 134 Mich. 682, 97 N.W. 36 (1903).
102. 52 Ohio St. 88, 39 N.E. 22 (1894).
103. Detroit United Railway, 134 Mich. at 686, 97 N.W. at 38.
104. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street Railway Co., 184 U.S. 368 (1902);
Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285 (1899); Chicago & Alton
Railway Co. v. City of Carlinville, 200 Ill.
314, 65 N.E. 730 (1902); Detroit United Railway, 134
Mich. 682, 97 N.W. 36 (1903); City of Kalamazoo v. Traction Co., 126 Mich. 525, 85 N.W.
1067 (1901).
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lost for substantially the same reasons that the Detroit company had lost ten
years before. 105
The union viewed legislation prescribing maximum hours of work as
more crucial to worker safety than air brake legislation. According to Motorman and Conductor, "[m]ore accidents [could] be traced to long hours of service than any other cause."10 6 While the companies were often quick to blame
accidents on the employees, the union argued that the real cause was inhumanely long working hours.107 In this area, the union enjoyed moderate success. Most labor victories in general involved maximum work hours
legislation for women and children." 8 But between 1886 and 1906, eleven
states passed laws making ten or twelve hours the maximum day's work for
street carmen 3 9
Company resistance to maximum hours legislation was strong because of
the unique nature of work-time requirements in the car industry. The major
traffic times spanned at least twelve hours with rush hours at both ends of the
work day. Since business sharply dropped immediately before and after rush
hour, a two shift schedule was costly. In addition, the workers themselves
were inconsistent on the issue, often needing the pay that their long hours
provided. In 1911 and 1912, when the Massachusetts legislature was considering an Amalgamated- sponsored "nine in eleven hour bill," which allowed
for no more than nine hours of work during an eleven hour period (a remedy
for the time-consuming "split shifts"), members of some Amalgamated divisions sent protest petitions to the legislature, forcing Vice-President Reardon
to come from Detroit to represent the union's position.110 The measure was
defeated in the legislature by one vote.III Union concern for work hours legislation did not extend to wages, however, because the Amalgamated strongly
opposed minimum wage laws on the ground that they would invariably reduce
wage levels. It feared that any minimum wage standard would become the
prevailing wage. 12
Aside from its fight for municipal ownership, vestibule laws, air brake
105.
106.
107.
operators

People v. Public Service Commission, 157 A.D. 698, 142 N.Y.S. 942 (1913).
MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Sept. 1904.
Motorman and Conductor blamed high injury rates on the companies' insistence that
work eleven to fourteen hours a day and that they keep the cars moving quickly.

Jan. 1900, at 10.
108. See Brandeis, Labor Legislation, 3 HISTORY

MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR,

OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES,

1896-1932, supra note 1, at 399-563. This is a classic survey of the scope of protective labor

legislation which shows that society's concern for and protection of women and children preceded its protection of men, and, in fact, partially paved the way for the more general hours
legislation that also encompassed men.
109. Id at 548-50. The federal law on railroad workers generally is 34 Stat. 1415-17

(1907), upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Erie P_ R. Co. v. New York, 233 U.S.
671 (1914).

110. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Mar. 1911, at 24; Jan. 1912, at 12; Apr. 1912, at 27,
31; May 1912, at 33; Feb. 1912, at 12.
111. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, June 1911, at 23.
112.

MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR,

Mar. 1913, at 5-7.
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laws, and maximum hours laws, the union was also active in other legislative
areas. For example, to provoke federal intervention in strikes, many car companies painted the words "U.S. Mail" on all their cars. The disruption of mail
service had been a factor in the government's decision to use federal troops in
the 1894 Pullman strike. '1 3 Consequently, the Amalgamated was careful to
let "mail cars" pass unmolested. However, if all the cars were so marked, it
was impossible for the union to block any cars at all in a strike. The union
repeatedly protested this company practice to their congressional representatives and to postal authorities. A postal regulation resulted which provided
that removable signs be used and posted only while cars actually carried
11 4
mail.
For a union whose resources were taxed by strikes and which believed in
"direct legislation" because federal and state legislative bodies, like the courts,
were in the hands of monopoly capitalists, such lobbying initiatives were significant. ,5 They indicated that, despite the apparent contradiction, the Amalgamated, like other social democratic political organizations and trade unions
of the day, had great faith in democracy and in a social democratic future for
America. In addition, they saw the legislative fights against the employers as a
propaganda war which, like the demand for arbitration,
was calculated to win
16
communities.'
the
of
segments
"neutral"
over
V
CONCLUSION

American labor law is most often viewed as a body of reform measures
introduced by corporate liberals as an alternative to the large-scale class violence that occurred throughout the country from the 1880s to the 1930s.
However, this analysis is class-biased and involves assumptions about the history of labor law that understate the importance of the workers. Organized in
labor unions, the workers had goals that reflected their own class interests and
their own experiences. The ultimate evolution of American labor law cannot
be adequately understood without an appreciation of the contribution of organized labor.
As illustrated by the Amalgamated, labor organizing reached a sophisticated level by the turn of the century. Beginning in the early 1890s, the union
correctly assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the car companies. It
turned this understanding into a successful strategy that coupled virtually un113. See S. BUDER, PULLMAN: AN EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL ORDER AND COMMUPLANNING 1880-1930 183 (1967).
114. MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, May 1897, at 4.
115. The theoretical basis for the direct legislation movement was the domination of legislatures by corporations. Big business succeeded in blocking laws that benefited working people.
The union's solution was to put particular laws to popular votes, a process termed "direct
legislation." MOTORMAN AND CONDUCTOR, Aug. 1905, at 6.
116. Porter, No Beans and Rice for Columbus, 10 INT'L SOCIALIST REV. 1069, 1069-71
(1910); Heston, supra note 68.
NITY
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precedented street violence with creative and innovative legal initiatives that
led to the organization of strong unions within a strongly anti-union industry
during an epoch of anti-labor political and legal activity.
The key to the Amalgamated's success was its shrewd comprehension of
the relationship between legal and social action. 1 7 Critical to its strategy was
its adoption and reformulation of the concept of arbitration from the defunct
Knights of Labor. The Knights' arbitration policy had been weak and ineffective and led to its reluctance to strike. The employers interpreted this reluctance as a weakness which could be exploited. The Amalgamated, however,
was willing to aggressively strike at a time when the strike was a politically
difficult and marginally legal activity. Yet the Amalgamated legitimated this
strike activity through its espousal of an arbitration policy that led to the
favorable (and accurate) perception that the Amalgamated was flexible and
willing to settle, while the companies were intransigent and guilty of escalating
strike violence.
The employers were caught in a kind of trap. They could rely on violence,
through the use of either private guards or local police, to protect their property rights. But violence had high social costs. In other industries, many employers were able to use violence and blame it on the unions. The
Amalgamated's arbitration policy seriously weakened that option in the streetcar industry. At the same time, to agree to arbitration meant recognizing the
union and automatically losing the major strike issue. Once the employer sat
down to arbitrate with the union, it implicitly recognized that the workers
were unionized and that the union represented them.
The call for arbitration to end industrial violence became widespread after the early years of the twentieth century. Many states created arbitration
commissions before the federal government finally established a commission
for railroads in 1925. These efforts are popularly seen as part of the middle
class progressive reform movement's effort to build some kind of legal framework to contain unregulated class violence. However, for the Amalgamated,
arbitration was not a middle-class reformers' idea but one part of a carefully
thought out union strategy to fight for and achieve the goal of union recognition. This strategy, at least in the short run, worked. Yet, while the Amalgamated achieved the goal of union recognition, it lost control of its vision. For
example, the union demand for municipal ownership, which was part of a
social democratic vision of the American future, was achieved by socializing
expensive and money-losing urban services. The Amalgamated's commitment
to the law carried within it an optimistic notion of what working class political
action could create if in control of the political process. With the failure to
achieve that political goal, arbitration was reduced to an "official" form to
resolve differences between employers and workers. At that point, generally
117. W. GAMSON, STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL PROTEST (1975), demonstrates this claim empirically, showing historically that social movements willing to use violence have a greater
chance of achieving their goals.
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well after the Progessive era, it was widely adopted across class lines. And one
critical element of that legal form is collective bargaining - a common, legally enforced mechanism central to modem labor law.
The current importance of collective bargaining, however, raises a whole
set of complex issues. By moving to a model of "contract unionism," unions
now primarily serve a legal function. Their major responsibility has become
the negotiation and management of labor contracts. Thus, unions have moved
from working-class political action to the courts and negotiating rooms - the
very places where the early unions felt disadvantaged and discriminated
against by a legal system run by the wealthier classes. As any observer of the
modem trade unions knows, the unions are not having much success. The
early Amalgamated, with one foot in the streets and union halls, and the other
very tentatively in the courts and negotiating rooms, may serve as some kind
of reminder of a union strategy that can work in the United States.
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